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Sectors of Sibu Sire Woreda, East Wollega Zone, 
Oromia Regional State 
 
ABSTRACT 
This research was conducted on fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia with the 
case of primary sectors of Sibu Sire Woreda, East Wollega Zone, Oromia 
Regional State. To attain the objective, researchers relied on primary data 
followed by secondary sources. To obtain primary data, a mixed approach with 
the descriptive design was considered. Probability and non-probability 
samplings were employed to get the sample of size of 96 whereas non-
probability sampling technique was used to select 18 key informants’ 
interviewees (KIIs) and 7 participants for focus group discussion (FGD). The 
findings of this research revealed that the principle of fiscal decentralization 
that is the autonomy of sectors is not found in practice. The selected areas were 
highly dependent on the allocated regional grant and had minimal capacity 
(null in some industries) to generate internal revenue. The expenditure 
responsibilities of the five selected sectors in the Woreda were limited to 
recurrent expenditures except for the road sector and some extent water sector. 
Data proved the existence of both vertical and horizontal imbalances in terms of 
revenue generation capacity and percentage of budget share of each industry 
that ultimately hinder the fiscal autonomy of the sectors in particular and that 
of the Woreda and local government in general. 
Keywords:  Fiscal Decentralization, Fiscal Imbalance, Fiscal Autonomy, Revenue and 
Expenditure, Sibu Sire Woreda, Oromia  
 
 
ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini dilakukan pada desentralisasi fiskal di Ethiopia pada kasus sektor 
primer Sibu Sire Woreda, Zona Wollega Timur, Negara Bagian Oromia. Dalam 
mencapai tujuan penelitian, peneliti menggunakan data primer disertai data 
sekunder. Untuk mendapatkan data primer, dilakukan pendekatan desain 
deskriptif yang dikolaborasikan dengan data sekunder. Sampel probabilitas 
dan non-probabilitas digunakan untuk mendapatkan sampel sebanyak 96 
sedangkan teknik pengambilan sampel non-probabilitas digunakan dengan 
memilih 18 informan kunci dengan teknik wawancara (KII) dan 7 peserta untuk 
diskusi kelompok fokus (FGD). Temuan penelitian ini mengungkapkan bahwa 
prinsip desentralisasi fiskal yaitu otonomi sektor tidak ditemukan dalam 
praktiknya. Daerah yang dipilih sangat tergantung pada hibah daerah yang 
dialokasikan dan memiliki kapasitas minimal (nol di beberapa industri) untuk 
menghasilkan pendapatan internal. Tanggung jawab pengeluaran dari lima 
sektor terpilih di Woreda terbatas pada pengeluaran yang berulang kecuali 
untuk sektor jalan dan beberapa sektor air. Data membuktikan adanya 
ketidakseimbangan vertikal dan horizontal dalam hal kapasitas menghasilkan 
pendapatan dan persentase bagian anggaran dari masing-masing industri yang 
pada akhirnya menghambat otonomi fiskal dari sektor-sektor tertentu dari 
Woreda dan pemerintah daerah pada umumnya. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decentralization has become a momentum, especially in the last decade of the 20th century, both 
in developed and developing countries (Kwon, 2002). The reasons to justify decentralization are both 
economic and non-economic in their types (Deribe A., 2015). Fiscal decentralization as one of the kinds of 
devolution deals with the devolution of revenue and expenditure responsibilities down to local 
governments as well as to institutions of lower governments (Abraham, 2011). The Constitution of 
Ethiopia 1995 has provided a legal foundation to govern the principles of fiscal decentralization and 
autonomy of local governments in Ethiopia. Article 50 (4) of the Ethiopian Constitution directs the 
governments of regional states to grant adequate power to the lowest units of government. In the light of 
given provisions of the Federal Constitution, the Constitution of Oromia Regional State indicated that 
district administrations had been assigned revenue sources (Desalegn, 2015). World Bank (1997) as one of 
the significant financers to the government of Ethiopia asserts the exercise of autonomy to the actors in 
decentralization like local institutions, committees, elected or appointed officials and individuals or 
corporates those have certain types of power over revenue sources and expenditure (World Bank, 1997; 
Abraham G., 2011).  
However, the findings of different researches conducted (Melkamu, 2004), (Demelash, 2011), 
(Tesfaye, 2015) and (Alam, M. & Girma, 2017) indicated that, fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia is 
constrained by imbalances, lack of capacity, centralization of revenue bases and inadequate devolution of 
functions. These researches revealed that the challenges of fiscal decentralization in the country at lower 
levels of government are exacerbated due to lack of autonomy in the sectors. The districts (Woredas) in 
Oromia regional state receive more budgets from the local government mainly to finance the expenditure 
requirements of the areas (Fekadu, 2011). On the other hand, there is an argument that the fiscal autonomy 
of local institutions (sectors) enhances the efficiency of service delivery. It is under this background; this 
research was conducted to assess the fiscal decentralization in the selected major areas of Sibu Sire Woreda 
of Oromia regional state. 
Fiscal decentralization strengthens federal units, local powers, and local institutions to be 
autonomous to generate revenue sources and to manage expenditures independently. The sharing of 
responsibilities between regional and sub-regional levels of government like Zonal, Woreda, and Kebele 
facilitates the performance of different sectors and ultimately promotes participation in service delivery. 
As stated earlier, the principle of fiscal decentralization requires fiscal autonomy of various 
organizations/industries. In Ethiopia, expenditure and revenue assignments are given to different layers 
of government, including the lower administrations. In the case of Oromia regional state, district 
administrations are constitutionally authorized with fiscal power to collect their revenue to meet their 
respective expenditure (Desalegn, 2015). 
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However, the problem of concerning the gap between the expenditure needs and revenue capacity 
at local tiers of government matters (Meheret, 2007). Even though district administrations have been 
constitutionally guaranteed of fiscal powers, there are different challenges. The challenges include 
economic gap, lack of adequate revenue bases, lack of capacity, etc. as pointed out in the works of 
(Melkamu, 2004) and (Tesfaye, 2015) that the prevalence of horizontal and vertical imbalance is the main 
challenges of fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia. On the other hand, there is inequality or disparities among 
major sectors at a lower tier of government (Alam, M. & Girma, 2017). From the perspective of this 
research, in addition to the above challenges, the challenge of fiscal decentralization includes the weak 
capacity of sectors at district (Woreda) level. The manifestation of this inadequate capacity includes little 
activity to generate own revenue from locally available resources, and thereby it evidences a mismatch 
between revenue and expenditure responsibilities to different sectors at the district level. This results in 
dependency on areas of Woreda on regional government. This dependency syndrome creates both vertical 
and horizontal imbalances among sectors as challenges of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, this research 
assessed the fiscal decentralization in Sibu Sire Woreda, with particular emphasis on selected sectors. 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Conceptual Framework 
Different scholars define the term decentralization in different ways, but there is a consensus 
among scholars that it refers to the transfer of authority and responsibility including fiscal responsibility 
down to lower levels of government and governmental institutions which are responsible for providing 
services to people at grassroots (Abraham G., 2011). However, to implement and to sustain local 
autonomy, fiscal decentralization must have necessary provisions along with adequate revenue bases. The 
revenue sources are not limited to those transferred from the central or regional government, but locally 
available revenue bases should be harvested. Fiscal decentralization can take many forms. One of the 
forms is that it includes co-financing by the participation of beneficiaries through monetary or labour 
contributions. Thus, it does not only take forms like an expansion of taxes and intergovernmental transfers 
(Deribe A., 2015). 
Theoretical Arguments 
Different scholars forwarded their ideas concerning fiscal decentralization. The most crucial 
benefit of fiscal decentralization is the gain that comes as a result of devolving or making governance 
closer to the people (Bahil, 2009). As pointed out in the work of (Demelash, 2011), fiscal decentralization 
improves the efficiency of the public sector and promotes long- term economic development. The local 
government is more effective than the central government in drawing up public policy. This idea is 
justified as the local government does not incur more cost to gather more information about residents’ 
preference (ibid). Similarly, Oates argued that local governments have a better knowledge of local 
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condition and preferences than the top level of a government. This is due to physical and institutional 
proximity local administrations have, and so it enhances economic efficiency than centralization of power 
and responsibilities (Oates, 1972). On the other hand, local government can exercise power over resources 
and can spend according to local preferences. The principle of fiscal decentralization requires devolving 
of revenue and expenditure responsibilities down to the local institutions (Abraham G., 2011). 
Helen stated that several accepted theories provide strong justification for devolved decision 
making on the grounds of efficiency, accountability, manageability and autonomy (Helen, 2010). As stated 
above, decentralization in general and fiscal decentralization, in particular, has a bulk of benefits for 
economic development. However, most of the time, challenges of implementing decentralization matters 
mainly in developing countries (Demelash, 2011). Further, Helen (2010) put forward the arguments for 
fiscal decentralization as: 
A representative government works best the closer it is to the people, and people should have the right to vote 
for the kinds and amounts of public services they want. According to the principle of corresponding theory, 
(quoted from Oates, 1972), the jurisdiction determining the level of provision of each public good should 
include precisely the set of individuals that consume it. According to the decentralization theorem, each 
public service should be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that 
would internalize the benefits and costs of such provision. The principles of fiscal equivalency, from the 
literature of public choice, also propose equating the political jurisdiction with the benefit area. 
However, Demelash argued that adopting decentralization is not a guarantee to bring economic 
transformation and failing to decentralize is not necessarily going to undermine development. The author 
substantiates it as follows: 
        The problem is to devise an appropriately structured system that mandates and provides incentives for 
responsible local government fiscal behaviour and enables the creation of a climate conducive to private 
investment and to develop the skills of local government employees to meet the requirements of the system 
and the abilities of central government officials to assist local governments in the process of their evolution 
to greater autonomy (Demelash, 2011). 
Weingast further provided another role of fiscal decentralization that places sub-national 
governments in competition with one another. Hence, pressure from inter-jurisdictional competition may 
motivate local governments to be innovative and accountable to their residents and to foster local 
economic prosperity rather than costly market intervention, service to interest groups and corruption 
(Weingast, 2006). However, Kwon pointed out the challenges of implementing fiscal decentralization in 
developing countries when he argued that the decentralized provision of public goods would increase 
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efficiency in resource allocation might not work in developing countries. The reason is that since they have 
the non-administrative capacity to carry out their own fiscal decisions, most developing countries do not 
meet arguments forwarded by fiscal decentralization theory. The author stated that without independent 
decision-making capacity in determining the quantity and quality of public goods provided and sources 
of finance that internalize the costs, decentralized provision of local public goods might not increase 
efficiency (Kwon, 2002). 
Similarly, the other argument against fiscal decentralization is that it can reinforce inequities due 
to imbalances in resources and tax sources and regional disparities in terms of infrastructure, education, 
health care, climate, culture differences and distance from the centre which may be an obstacle to full use 
of production factors (Demelash, 2011). Helen also pointed out that there would be a difference of real 
implementation of devolved powers and functions between advanced regions and local authorities which 
have access to more significant resources and dominance on the one hand and backward/more 
impoverished regions and localities which lack adequate resources. In light of this fact, the regions in 
Ethiopia cannot equally implement fiscal policies and strategies because of inequities in powers, resources, 
capacity etc. Thus, since regions and local powers in Ethiopia are not equal in terms of human power, 
resources, revenue bases, infrastructure and investment opportunities they vary in solving their respective 
local problems and to practice fiscal decentralization in the real sense (Helen, 2010). 
In many developing countries, as observed by World Bank, local governments or administrative 
units possess the legal authority to impose taxes, but the tax base is so weak and the dependence on central 
government subsidies so ingrained that no attempt is made to exercise that authority (World Bank, 2001). 
However, to overcome this challenge, the World Bank suggested as to how to structure an appropriate 
balance between local autonomy and central control that would allow regions and local powers to grasp 
the fruits of fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization requires considerable capacity building like the 
training as well as empowerment to exercise fiscal autonomy, e.g. how to overcome the challenge of useful 
revenue collection and how to make use of that revenue efficiently (ibid.). 
Fiscal Decentralization in Ethiopia 
According to the definition of fiscal decentralization, Meselu interpreted that the devolution of 
functions and responsibilities to Woreda government is the primary issue that needs to be addressed in 
the design of fiscal decentralization (Meselu, 2014). She further pointed out that the definition of powers 
and duties down to the Woreda government in Ethiopia is evolving and is functioning almost in the 
absence of a clear legal framework. Despite the lack of legal framework, Meheret observed that the trend 
and experience across regions in the country is towards decentralizing essential service delivery functions 
to the Woredas while assigning higher-order functions to regional governments (Meheret, 2010/11). 
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Kinds of literature revealed that district-level fiscal decentralization in Ethiopia is substantial by 
African standards if one takes into account intergovernmental transfers. With the decentralization to local 
government in 2002, a transparent formula based on a general-purpose grant that gives autonomy to local 
governments was introduced in four regions: Amhara, Oromia, SNNPRS, and Tigray. Dickovick observed 
that after 2002 in Ethiopia, regions used to allocate grants to Woreda based on some criteria like 
population, development level, and revenue collection effort. These three criteria/principles were used at 
the time for federal block grant allocations to the regions (Dickovick, 2010). However, Meselu, 2014 
revealed that one of the merits of a decentralized system in Ethiopia is that regions are free to choose their 
criteria for allocation of the block grant to the lower tier of government (i.e. Woreda), but it has to be done 
in a transparent way (Meselu, 2014). Accordingly, after 2003/2004, the formula is changed to unit cost 
approach (need-based approach). As Meselu indicated, the formula was pioneered first by the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) and later followed by other regions. 
Meheret (2007) critically observed that the authority and functions of lower tier of government in 
Ethiopia with respect to the source of revenue is limited. Woreda governments do not have the power to 
decide on the rate and base of taxes. Their responsibility and authority is limited to collecting and using 
taxes and passing a designated portion of it to regional government. Regional governments have the 
primary saying in determining both the tax rates and bases. As a result, mismatch occurred between 
expenditure responsibilities and revenue needed to cover or discharge those responsibilities that is one of 
the typical distinctive characteristics of Ethiopian district level decentralization (ibid). As mentioned in the 
work of Meselu, this limitation is the initial cause of the obstacles to the fiscal autonomy of Ethiopia’s local 
governments (Meselu, 2014). In the absence of low level of private economic activities, the limitation with 
respect to tax base at Woreda level especially in rural areas is exacerbated. This results in dependence of 
local levels of government on the top level of a government which leads to a heavy reliance on 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers to finance the bulk of expenditure responsibilities assigned to them 
(Tesfaye, 2015). Tesfaye indicated that Woredas rely heavily on regional governments’ transfers which 
range in between 80–90% (ibid).  
Other evidence that realizes Woredas are not practicing real fiscal decentralization is the maximum 
amounts of budgets transferred from the top are generally used for recurrent expenditure, rather than for 
capital expenditure. As pointed out in the work of Meheret (2007) that nearly 91% of Woreda’s budget 
earmarked for administrative and operational expenditures. Therefore, most capital activities at the 
Woreda level are financed from donors and aid agencies. On the other hand, the capital expenditures are 
covered by revenue from specific purpose grants from the region. Meheret further pointed out that on 
these allocated grants, authorities at the lower level do not have much say. This undermines the fiscal 
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autonomy of lower tier of government and it implies that even from the expenditure part only recurrent 
expenditure is decentralized while capital expenditure rests in the hand of central and regional 
government (Meheret, 2007).  
Different other empirical literature on fiscal decentralizations in Ethiopia reveals the same facts. 
Demelash (2011) explained that though theoretical background and general principles of fiscal 
decentralization are useful in intergovernmental fiscal relations, practical experience shows that country’s 
specific factors have significant role to play. The practice of fiscal decentralization is determined by 
conducive environment, capacity and adequate revenue bases which are at large not found at Woreda level. 
In Ethiopia, Proclamation No.33/1992 is considered as important legal instrument in the fiscal 
decentralization. As per the Proclamation, sharing of revenues between the federal government and 
federal units is to enable the central government and local governments to carry out their functions and 
responsibilities and to narrow the gap in development and economic growth between/amongst regions. 
In practice, the balance between expenditure and revenue generation capacity is rarely achieved and 
therefore, neither the center nor the region is able to cover its expenditure from its own fiscal resources 
(Eshetu C. , 1994). World Bank (2000) also observed the limitation of the capacity of the sub-national and 
sub-regional government in Ethiopia with respect to tax administration often coupled with centralization 
of productive revenue sources by the Central Government which results in the emergence of vertical 
imbalance (World Bank, 2000).  
The study undertaken by Fekadu revealed that a high level of dependency of regions on central 
government and Woredas on the regional government resulted in inefficiency problems. The regions and 
local authorities do not fully internalize the costs of public expenditure. Thus, they are supported by 
transfers from other parts of the country. Since regions and local tiers of government are not equal in terms 
of resources, ability to mobilize revenues and in terms of unequal location of resources, there is horizontal 
imbalance among them (Fekadu, 2011). Furthermore, the study conducted by Girma Chuluke & Minhaj 
Alam (2017) indicated that the horizontal imbalances are not only found among tiers of government but 
also sectors. For instance, the horizontal imbalance between or among sectors occurred when the budget 
allocation and utilization between/among the sectors is not uniform across the sectors. On the other hand, 
it is noted by the Annual Report of World Bank (1997) and corroborated by (Abraham G., 2011) that actors 
in fiscal decentralization include: 
Appointed or elected officials, NGOs, Chiefs, influential individuals or corporate bodies such as 
communities, cooperatives, and committees. Each of these actors is typically located in particular 
relations of accountability and has certain types of powers.  
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This implies that in the local arena, influential individuals and appointed officials can exercise their 
expertise for revenue generation and expenditure management. Accordingly, sector offices should be 
encouraged to generate some revenues and to cover some part of their expenditure needs rather than 
depending on the budget from the regional government. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   
The study is conducted in Sibu Sire Woreda, East Wollega Zone of Oromia Regional State, Western 
Ethiopia. It is one of the districts in East Wollega Zone and is located 281 Km in West from Addis Ababa 
and 50 km East from Nekemte, the administrative town of the Zone. The study area has a total population 
of 124,304. From this population, 6744 are male urban dwellers, and 6954 are females, whereas 54,920 are 
male rural dwellers and 55,686 are females. Sibu sire district has an estimated population density of 27.8 
people per square kilometer. In order to achieve the intended objective of the study, the descriptive design 
is used because it incorporates both quantitative and qualitative instruments of data collection. 
There are 33 sector offices in the Sibu Sire Woreda. Out of these, five primary sectors were selected by 
using non-probability (purposive) sampling technique: i) Agriculture, ii) Education, iii) Health, iv) Rural 
Road Authority, and v) Rural Water Supply. The first reason to apply non-probability is that they are the 
primary sectors; secondly, these are the sectors where a significant proportion of the Woreda budget is 
allocated. Besides, two Woreda Offices (Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development (WOFED) 
and Revenue Office) were taken into account because their inclusion is vital for undertaken research to 
assess the challenges and performances of fiscal decentralization at Woreda. For determining the sample 
size, researchers applied probability sampling formula determined by Yamane (1967). After the 
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determination of sample size, researchers applied probability proportional to size (PPS) to obtain 
representativeness of the population. Accordingly, 96 respondents were selected for the questionnaire 
distribution. 
n =  
N
1 + N(e)²
 
Where: n = the desired sample size   N = Universe population     e = the level of precision 
n =  
183
1 + 183(0.07)²
 
                               = 96  
Table 1. Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) 
S/N. Name of the Sectors & Offices No. of Staffs PPS 
1 Education Sector 31 16 
2 Health Sector 29 15 
3 Agricultural Sector 31 16 
4 Rural Road Sector 9 5 
5 Rural Water Sector 13 7 
6 WOFED Office 45 24 
7 Revenue Office 25 13  
Total 183 96 
Source: Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development (WOFED) 2018              
After determination of sample size, respondents were selected by considering different criteria like 
specialized knowledge, service duration, the duty, responsibility and power they have regarding the issue 
under study, and therefore, non-probability sampling was used to select the questionnaire participants 
from each sector. 
Table 2. Key Informants 
S/N. Name of the offices Number Positions 
1 Woreda Office of Finance and Economic 
Development 
2 Office head and expert 
2 Woreda Education Office 2 Office head and expert 
3 Woreda Administration Office 1 Woreda Administrator 
4 Woreda Revenue Office 2 Office head, expert 
5 Woreda Health Office 2 Office head and expert 
6 Woreda Water Office 2 Head office and expert 
7 Woreda Civil Service Office 1 Office head 
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8 Woreda Road Sector Office 2 Head office and expert 
9 Woreda Agriculture Sector Office 2 Office head and expert 
10 Zonal Revenue Authority Office 1 Head of the office 
11 ZOFED 1 Deputy head and expert 
 Total 18 key informants 
Source: Designed by Researchers, 2018 
Members of FGD were a mix of respondents from the five selected sectors and from WOFED as 
well as from the Office of Woreda Revenue Authority. They were seven in numbers and were heads of 
planning unit of each sector. This means one participant from each office. Collectively, three instruments 
of data collection were applied: questionnaire respondents = 96, key informants’ interviewees (KIIs) = 18 
and one focus group discussion (FGD) = 7. In this way, researchers got 121 total respondents for 
quantitative and qualitative tools 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Data revealed that there are sectors which have some revenue sources and so that the Council of 
the Woreda declares the generated revenue by the respective sectors as internal revenue of the sectors. In 
line with the principle of fiscal decentralization, the finding indicates that the local beneficiaries finance 
some part of the expenditure requirements of the sectors. The fiscal autonomy of sectors adds undeniable 
value for the efficiency of the sectors and devolvement of expenditure responsibilities to improve the 
quality of service delivery which maybe because of the factors like matured age, the experience of service 
in particular sector and level of education. Further, it can be observed that three sectors (education, health 
and road) out of five in the study area are practising in a way that they can finance at least meagre amount 
of their expenditure from their revenue. However, the observation of Meselu (2014) that the Woreda 
government in Ethiopia is evolving and is functioning almost in the absence of a clear legal framework is 
found in the study area. The respondents said that they are facing the challenges of fiscal autonomy of 
sectors in terms of independent decision-making of revenue generation and utilization.  
The number of respondents from selected sectors was 96, and the non-responsive rate was zero. 
Hence, 96 questionnaires were filled and returned with 23 females and 73 males. The distribution of the 
respondents is shown in the following table below: 
Table 3. Characteristics of the Respondents for the Study 
 
Sectors/offices 
Sex Age Service 
Year 
Level of Education 
T
o
ta
l 
M F Below 
35 
35 & 
above 
Above 5 Diplom
a 
BA/ 
BSC & above 
Education 12 4 6 10 13 5 11 16 
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Health 11 4 6 9 11 6 9 15 
Agricultural 13 3 4 12 12 4 12 16 
Road 3 2 1 4 3 2 3 5 
Water 7 - 2 5 5 3 4 7 
WOFED Office 17 7 10 14 19 6 18 24 
Revenue Office 10 3 5 8 8 6 7 13 
Total 73 23 34 62 71 32 64 96 
Source: Field Survey, 2018 
The prime purpose of the set of questionnaires to triangulate the information gathered from key 
informants and details of quantitative data of revenue generation and revenue expenditure from the 
selected offices. Table 4.1 above shows the characteristics of the respondents in terms of sex, age, service 
year and level of education. Data indicated that there were 73 Males and 23 Females. From this, it can be 
inferred that gender balance in the appointment is low. Concerning age, 62 respondents are above 35 years 
of age, whereas 34 respondents are below 35 years of age. It shows that the majority of respondents are 
matured enough. Experience and level of education, 71 respondents have above five years of experience, 
whereas 64 respondents are degree holders of either B.A, B.SC and above. The experience and educational 
background of respondents served the purpose of getting more accurate information about fiscal 
decentralization in the study area. 
Revenue and Expenditure Responsibilities in the Selected Sectors 
The arguments and principles of fiscal decentralization require the sectors to generate their 
revenue and exercise adequate expenditure responsibilities. Financial decision-making autonomy in 
particular and decentralization, in general, should be devolved down to sectors to elected or appointed 
governing bodies. In line with this, the sectors in the Woreda under study are assumed to generate revenue 
internally to cover some portion of their expenses and on the other side to become a backbone for the 
Woreda’s autonomy. 
 Trend of Budget Expenditure in Education Sector 
As indicated in the constitution of Oromia National Regional State (Article, 77) that the Woreda 
administration must provide primary education service up to 10th grade. For this purpose, the education 
sector in the selected Woreda depends on different revenue sources like revenue from the regional 
government through Woreda (block grant), own revenue generated by the sector itself and from other 
sources. In table 4.2 (A) below budget expenditure for the education and the extent of dependency of the 
sector is described. 
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Table 4. Pattern of Budget for the Education Sector and its Fiscal Imbalance in (ETB) 
Year Grants/Allocation Total 
(C+R) 
Revenue Gap/Imbalance % of 
imbalance Recurrent 
(R) 
Capital 
(C) 
2012/13 15,533,300 169,341 15,702,641 310,566 15,392,075 98 
2013/14 16,348,755 _ 16,348,755 297,969 16,050,786 98.2 
2014/15 18,764,418 _ 18,764,418 1,170,000 17,594,418 93.8 
2015/16 27,112, 693 1,423,296 28,535,989 200,000 28,335,989 99.2 
2016/17 28,318,719 886,883 29,205,602 201,730 29,003,872 99.3 
Source: Researchers’ Calculation, 2018   ETB: Ethiopian Birr 
 
As observed in table 4 above it shows how the education sector depends on the budget allocated 
by the regional bureau through the Woreda. Throughout the years under discussion, the sector depends 
97.7% on the regional government. On average, the sector covers only 2.3% of its budget requirements. 
Table 4 above also shows that most of the budget expenditure of education sector goes to the recurrent 
expenditure which proves that there is almost no fiscal autonomy in this sector. 
Table 5. Share of Education Budget out of the Total Woreda Budget (ETB) 
Year Woreda Budget Education Budget Education Budget Share 
2012/13 34, 938,739 15,702,641 44.9% 
2013/14 42,620,752 16,348,755 38.4% 
2014/15 58,801,002 18,764,418 31.9% 
2015/16 78,968,275 28,535,989 36.1% 
2016/17 82,943,317 29,205,602 35.2% 
Source: Researchers’ Calculation, 2018 
As observed in table 5 the budget allocated for education takes the lion’s share of Woreda’s budget 
expenditure. It takes 37.3% on average. This reflects the high priority that education occupies at the lower 
level of government. However, the financial discretion of the Woreda is constrained by limited financial 
resources as can be observed from the data. 
Trend of Budget Expenditure in Health Sector 
Article 77 of the Oromia Regional State Revised Constitution indicated that Woreda administration 
is responsible for the provision of health services for the residents and to construct health centres and 
posts as well as to administer intermediate primary health establishments. Accordingly, Woreda 
government and the sector office are charged with the responsibilities and are highly dependent on grants 
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to fulfil the responsibilities. Table 6 shows the amount of budget allocated for the health sector and its 
extent of dependency on the Woreda from 2012/13 – 2016/17. 
Table 6. Pattern of Budget for the Health Sector and the Fiscal Imbalance of the Sector (ETB) 
Year Grants/Allocation Total 
(C+R) 
Revenue Gap/Imbalance % of 
imbalance Recurrent 
(R) 
Capital 
(C) 
2012/13 3,195,656 148,516 3,344,172 399,200 2,944,972 88 
2013/14 4,178,059 23,203 4,201,262 532,113 3,669,149 87.3 
2014/15 5,470,600 553,026 6,023,626 1,631,000 5,860,526 97.3 
2015/16 7,915,595 1,070,054 8,985,649 950,000 8,035,649 89.4 
2016/17 8,494,746 140,000 8,634,746 950,000 7,684,746 89 
Source: Researchers’ Calculation, 2018 
It can be observed from table 6 that there is a high fiscal imbalance in the health sector of Sibu Sire 
Woreda, which is negatively correlated with the principle of fiscal decentralization. The primary source 
of revenue for the sector is the grant, which accounts for 90.2% on an average throughout the years under 
discussion. This implies that this sector highly depends on the grant for its expenditure requirements 
whereas its revenue contribution on an average to the total budget of the sector is 9.8%.   
Table 7. Share of Health Budget out of the Total Woreda Budget (ETB) 
Year Woreda Budget Health Sector Budget Education Budget Share 
2012/13 34, 938,739 3,344,172 9.6% 
2013/14 42,620,752 4,201,262 9.9% 
2014/15 58,801,002 6,023,626 10.2% 
2015/16 78,968,275 8,985,649 11.4% 
2016/17 82,943,317 8,634,746 10.4% 
Source: Researchers’ Calculation, 2018 
From table 7, it can be inferred that throughout the consecutive five years under discussion, the 
health has an average share of 10.3% from the total budget of the Woreda. The share of the education 
sector is 37.3%, which is 3.6 times greater than the health sector. The participants of crucial informants and 
FGDs clarified that the gap between two sectors is because of the priority the government has given to the 
education sector in the study area. 
Trend of Budget Expenditure in Agricultural Sector  
Article 77(d) of Oromia Regional State Revised Constitution states that the Woreda government 
has responsibilities to preserve and administer essential agricultural services and natural resources in its 
jurisdiction and the sector office is responsible for the mandate. Thus, to execute the mandated 
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responsibilities, table 8 shows the budget allocated for the agricultural sector in the Woreda in terms of 
recurrent and capital as well the extent of the fiscal imbalance in the sector. 
Table 8. Pattern of Budget for Agricultural Sector and the Fiscal Imbalance of the Sector 
(ETB) 
Year Grants/Allocation Total 
(C+R) 
Revenue Gap/Imbalance % of 
imbalance Recurrent 
(R) 
Capital 
(C) 
2012/13 2,260,003 547,486 2,807,489 0 2,807,489 100% 
2013/14 3,151,884 634,510 3,789,394 0 3,789,394 100% 
2014/15 3,506, 906 594,090 4,100, 996 0 4,100, 996 100% 
2015/16 5,338,564 1,012,444 6,351,008 0 6,351,008 100% 
2016/17 3,949,418 889,305 4,838,723 0 4,838,723 100% 
Source: Researchers’ Calculation, 2018 
It can be observed from table 8, similar to other sectors like education and health that the budget 
for capital expenditure is low. The recurrent and capital budget allocated for the sector is on an average 
83.2% and 16.8% respectively, the difference of which makes the sector to lag in adopting projects for the 
improvement of the sector. The other fact revealed from the table is the total incompatibility of the 
principle of fiscal decentralization in the agricultural sector in the study area. According to the key 
informants, which the sector has not been capacitated to generate its revenue throughout the years under 
discussion, which led the sector to depend 100% on the grant. They pointed out that farmers are not 
educated and therefore they lack the willingness to adapt the scientific means of agriculture on the one 
hand and lack of awareness and training to equip with the modern farming system on the other. All 
participants of FGD univocally reasoned out that the condition is more or less equal to the subsistence 
farming in the study area which does not give any scope for revenue generation. 
Table 9. Share of Agriculture Budget out of the Total Woreda Budget (ETB) 
Year Woreda Budget Agriculture Budget Education Budget Share 
2012/13 34, 938,739 2,807,489 8% 
2013/14 42,620,752 3,789,394 8.9% 
2014/15 58,801,002 4,100, 996 7% 
2015/16 78,968,275 6,351,008 8% 
2016/17 82,943,317 4,838,723 5.% 
Source: Researchers’ Calculation, 2018 
Table 9 shows the share of the agricultural sector from the Woreda’s total budget from 2012/13 to 
2016/17. It can be observed that the share of the budget is much low, that is, on an average 7.4% while 
comparing with other two sectors discussed previously were education and health share 37.3% and 10.3% 
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respectively from the total budget of the Woreda. Data further revealed the trends of these three sectors 
where the education sector shows a decreasing trend; health sector shows increasing trend and agriculture 
sector shows an almost similar trend with low budget. Key informants said that agriculture is not given 
much priority, which is reflected in the share of this sector from the total budget. Participants of FGD 
further pointed out that this may be one of the factors for nil revenue generation. 
Trend of Expenditure Budget in Road Sector  
Decentralization involves the devolution of the provision of roads as part of responsibilities to the 
local level of government.  In line with this fact, it is stated in the work of Fekadu (2011) and Desalegn 
Chala (2015) that the provision of the road in Ethiopia ought to be a shared power and responsibility. They 
explained that the main factor of relevance in the assignment of expenditure to local authorities in Ethiopia 
is the scope of the benefits of the service.  
The respondents explained that even though the sector requires more budgets for the expansion of 
rural roads, the budget allocated from the regional bureau is small. One of the key informants from the 
sector informs: 
Most of the time, the allocated budget is less than 60% of the planned budget. For instance, in the budget 
year of 2015/16, the allocated budget for the road sector was 2,466,138 while the planned budget was 4.5 
million birr.  
Table 10. Pattern of Budget for Road Sector and the Fiscal Imbalance of the Sector (ETB) 
Year Grants/Allocation Total 
(C+R) 
Revenue Gap/Imbalance % of 
imbalance Recurrent 
(R) 
Capital (C) 
2012/13 303,449 1, 011,203 1, 314,652 1,169,000 145,652 11 
2013/14 355,420 912,434 1,267,854 965,258 302,596 24 
2014/15 427,732 2,609,043 3,036,775 1,708,602 1,328,173 43.7 
2015/16 666,138 1,800,000 2,466,138 811,537 1,654,601 67 
2016/17 974,376 1,301,082 2,275,458 500,000 1,775,458 78 
Source: Researchers’ Calculation, 2018 
Table 10 shows that even though the road sector has high dependency syndrome, it has a better 
capacity of revenue generation comparing to other undertaken sectors. The revenue capacity of the sector 
shows fluctuation, and on an average, the sector depends 44.74% on the grant for its expenditure 
requirements. In other words, it means that the sector can cover 55.26% of its expenditure requirement by 
generating its revenue. On the other side, data shown in table 10 indicated the reality on the ground 
regarding the accessibility of rural road to residents and because of which capital budget allocation is 
much higher than other selected sectors of the Woreda. Key informants pointed out that the given budget 
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for this sector is not sufficient, and it is half of the expenditure requirement. Participants of FGD revealed 
the potential capacity of revenue generation of this sector if it were in proportion to the planned budget.  
Table 11. Share of Rural Road Budget out of the Total Woreda Budget (ETB) 
Year Woreda Budget Road Budget Education Budget Share 
2012/13     34, 938,739       1, 314,652 3.8% 
2013/14     42,620,752       1,267,854 3% 
2014/15     58,801,002       3,036,775 5.2% 
2015/16     78,968,275       2,466,138 3.1% 
2016/17     82,943,317       2,275,458 2.7% 
Source: Researchers’ Calculation, 2018 
Table 11 indicated that the share of road sector throughout the years under discussion is less than 
3.56% on an average. The share of the sector shows that fluctuation expects little improvement in the year 
2014/15. The table further shows that the rural road in the Woreda is not getting much attention 
comparatively. As clarified by the key informants that this sector is one of the least sectors in terms of 
Woreda’s share of the budget, therefore, to minimize the challenge, the sector practices some revenue 
generation activities mainly by mobilizing the beneficiaries. 
Trend of Expenditure Budget in Water Sector 
One of the assigned responsibilities to the Woreda is related to the provision of rural water supply 
for the residents, which needs an adequate budget for the purpose. Budget allocation for the sector and its 
fiscal imbalance is presented as follows:  
Table 12. Pattern of Budget for Water Sector and the Fiscal Imbalance of the Sector (ETB) 
Year Grants/Allocation Total 
(C+R) 
Revenue Gap/Imbalance % of 
imbalance Recurrent 
(R) 
Capital (C) 
2012/13 404,287 303,680 712,967 0 712,967 100% 
2013/14 457,908 317,059 774,967 0 774,967 100% 
2014/15 513,395 600,000 1,113,395 0 1,113,395 100% 
2015/16 712,345 400,660 1,113,005 0 1,113,005 100% 
2016/17 898,722 330,511 1,229,233 0 1,229,233 100% 
Source: Researchers’ Calculation, 2018 
From table 12, it can be inferred that the water sector has shown nil in its revenue generation to 
cover its expenditure. Lack of autonomy of the sector exacerbates the dependency of the Woreda on the 
regional government. This situation is explained by the critical informant while giving justification for the 
mismatch between expenditure requirement and the budget allocation, he says: 
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 For instance, in 2017, we had planned to develop 35 springs, and we achieved only 15. Even from the 15 
springs, only three were covered by the budget allocated for this sector. A fund developed three springs 
mobilized through community participation besides the support from the regional sector bureau, and World 
Vision developed nine springs in the Woreda. Every year, we used to face a similar challenge of budget 
inadequacy. 
Table 13. Share of Rural Water Budget out of the Total Woreda Budget (ETB) 
 
 
Year 
 
Woreda Budget 
 
Water Budget Water Sector 
Budget Share 
Recurrent Capital Total 
2012/13 34, 938,739 404,287 303,680 712,967 2% 
2013/14 42,620,752 457,908 317,059 774,967 1.8% 
2014/15 58,801,002 513,395 600,000 1,113,395 1.9% 
2015/16 78,968,275 712,345 400,660 1,113,005 1.4% 
2016/17 82,943,317 898,722 330,511 1,229,233 1.5% 
Source: Researchers’ Calculation, 2018 
As indicated in table 13, water sector’s share from the total budget of the Woreda is the least from 
the sectors under discussion which are 1.72% on an average throughout the five consecutive years 2012/13 
to 2016/17. 
Theoretical Interpretation of Findings  
The findings supported the theoretical interpretation of Kwon who pointed out that most of the 
developing countries have the non-administrative capacity to carry out their own fiscal decisions and they 
do not meet arguments forwarded by fiscal decentralization theory. After observing the level of 
imbalances and autonomy of sectors in the study area, the author has rightly stated that without 
independent decision-making capacity in determining the quantity and quality of public goods provided 
and sources of finance that internalize the costs, decentralized provision of local public goods may not 
increase efficiency (Kwon, 2002). The proposition of Helen matched with the observation of researchers in 
the study area in terms of human power, resources, revenue bases, infrastructure, investment 
opportunities which vary in solving particular local problems and to practice fiscal decentralization in the 
real sense (Helen, 2010). Pragmatism of World Bank found in the study area because constitutionally, the 
local government of Woreda or administrative units/sectors must possess the legal authority to impose 
taxes but the tax base is so weak and the dependence on regional/central government subsidies so 
ingrained that no attempt is made to exercise that authority (World Bank, 2001). 
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CONCLUSION  
This research has undertaken two variables to analyze revenue generation capacity and percentage 
share of revenue allocation/grant of each sector out of the total budget of Woreda to check the autonomy 
of the sector in fiscal decentralization. From the first variable of revenue generation, the average share of 
five undertaken sectors of education, health, agriculture, rural road and water supply is 2.3%, 9.8%, nil, 
55.26%, and nil respectively. This proves that there is a high prevalence of vertical imbalance in terms of 
revenue generation capacity and expenditure requirement in the study area, which at the same time is 
antithetical to the principle of fiscal decentralization. Concerning the second variable, out of the total budget 
of the Woreda, data revealed that undertaken five sectors of education, health, agriculture, rural road and 
water supply, the percentage share is 37.3%, 10.3%, 7.4%, 3.56% and 1.72% respectively. It can be 
observed that there is a high prevalence of horizontal imbalance among the sectors where the highest grant 
allocated sector is education, and the lowest one is the water sector. Based on these two main types of fiscal 
imbalance found in the study area, it can be concluded that the very purpose of implementing the fiscal 
decentralization does not fulfil the criteria of fiscal autonomy to the study Woreda in particular and the 
local government in general.  
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